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RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS AMONG SURFACE OWNERS,  
MINERAL OWNERS, AND LESSEES IN ARKANSAS 
 
G. Alan Perkins1
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Development of oil and gas resources requires use of the surface of the land.  
Most people would agree with this simple statement.  But the inherent conflict it 
represents gives rise to frequent disagreements and litigation between surface landowners 
and the mineral owner or operator attempting to produce oil and gas.  Several issues arise 
when oil and gas operations interfere with the surface use or when a landowner’s 
property is damaged or destroyed by oil and gas operations.  Can the surface owner stop 
or restrict the operator’s surface use?  Is the surface owner entitled to damage payments?  
If so, how are damages determined and when are payments due?  The problems are 
intensified when the mineral estate has been severed from the surface.  The surface-only 
owner faces the “predicament and frustration”2 of intrusion and damage, yet reaps no 
economic benefit from oil and gas development.  This paper considers these issues and 
the state of the law in Arkansas. 
 
II.  GENERAL RULE:  MINERAL ESTATE DOMINANCE  
OVER SURFACE ESTATE
 
 Arkansas allows the severance of the surface estate from the mineral estate by 
proper grant or reservation, thereby creating separate estates.3  The mineral interest owner 
has the inherent right to develop the minerals and the right to lease the minerals to others 
for development.4  When the mineral owner leases the right to produce oil and gas, his 
lessee succeeds to the mineral owner’s right of surface use, subject to explicit lease 
restrictions.  Dominance of the mineral estate over the surface is a crucial legal concept 
for the mineral owner and lessee because ownership of subsurface minerals without the 
right to use the surface to explore for and produce them would be practically worthless.  
The rule of mineral estate dominance has been stated in various ways in Arkansas: 
 
 In Wood v. Hay, 206 Ark. 892, 175 S.W.2d 189 (1943), the Arkansas Supreme 
Court reviewed a reservation of oil and gas interests, stating:  
 
The right to enter and to make reasonable use of the land in achieving in a 
workmanlike way the only result the parties could have intended (if, in fact, 
                                                 
1 Perkins & Trotter, PLLC, P.O. Box 251618, Little Rock, AR 72225-1618; ph. 501-603-9000; email: 
aperkins@perkinstrotter.com. 
2 Vest v. Exxon Corp., 752 F.2d 959, 960 (5th Cir. 1985). 
3 E.g., Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 229 Ark 181 (1958); Wood v. Hay, 206 Ark. 792 (1943); Huffman 
v. Henderson Co., 184 Ark. 278 (1931). 
4 See generally, Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 9 UALR L.J. 223, 225 (1986-87).   
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oil and gas in place, as distinguished from the right to lease, were retained) 
must be implied from the nature of the matters dealt with.  
 
Id., 175 S.W.2d at 190.  The Court then cited with approval the “better rule” stating that 
the mineral owner “has the right to enter on the surface with all usual necessary 
appliances, and to remove the mineral without any express authority reserved to that 
effect.”  Id.  Thankfully, later cases provided a more cogent statement of the basic rule: 
 
The general rule governing the right of the mineral owner is aptly stated in 10 
Thompson on Real Property § 5561 (1940): ‘As against the surface owner, 
the owner of the minerals has a right, without any express words of grant for 
that purpose, to go upon the surface to drill wells to his underlying estate, and 
to occupy so much of the surface beyond the limits of his well or wells as 
may be necessary to operate his estate and to remove the product thereof. . . .’ 
 
Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 890-91, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); 
 
The respective rights of mineral and surface owners are well settled.   The 
owner of the minerals has an implied right to go upon the surface to drill 
wells to his underlying estate, and to occupy so much of the surface beyond 
the limits of his well as may be necessary to operate his estate and to remove 
its products. 
 
Bonds v. Carter, 348 Ark. 591, 601, 75 S.W.3d 192 (2002) (Hannah, J., concurring). 
 
III.  CORRELATIVE RIGHTS AND REASONABLE USE  
OF THE SURFACE
 
 Establishing mineral estate dominance over the surface, however, does not define 
the nature or extent of allowable surface use.  How much is too much?  The Arkansas 
courts have addressed this broad issue in a number of cases.  However, the opinions 
frequently are fact-specific and focused on particular surface uses, making direct 
applicability to other situations limited.  Furthermore, when (as in most cases) the surface 
use is conducted pursuant to a lease, the lease terms themselves may control.  
Nevertheless, a review of cases considering reasonable surface use provides useful 
guidance. 
 
A.  Arkansas Cases Involving Reasonable Use. 
 
 ▪  Cutting timber and digging pit at drillsite:   
 
LeCroy v. Barney, 12 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1926) (On appeal from W.D. Ark.) – It was 
necessary, and therefore reasonable, for lessee to cut timber for clearing the drillsite and 
places where he intended to build tanks, towers, stations, or structures for the purpose of 
saving and taking care of the oil.  Lessor was not entitled to damages for timber cut or 
earth removed from pit. 
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 ▪  Ingress and egress / access to adjacent property: 
 
Martin v. Dale, 180 Ark. 321, 21 S.W.2d 428 (1929) – Lessee had right of access to 
leased lands only as necessary and not as matter of convenience.  Where another road 
was available to lessee, surface owner had right to forbid lessee’s use of more convenient 
road. 
 
Reimer v. Gulf Oil Corp., 281 Ark. 377, 664 S.W.2d 456 (1984) – Where lease provided 
right to construct necessary roads and also provided that a well site within the same 
drilling unit would be considered as upon lessor’s land, lessee was allowed to cross 
lessor’s surface estate to reach well on adjacent land within the drilling unit, and could be 
liable only for unreasonable use. 
 
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 (1966) – Damages 
were awarded to surface owner for timber clearing and excessive surface use where 
lessee built road 40 feet wide (among other things).   
 
McFarland v. Taylor, 76 Ark. App. 343, 65 S.W.3d 468 (2002) – Lessee forced to use 
alternative road for access, which required expensive improvements, because use of the 
favored road unreasonably interfered with surface owner’s use and alternative was 
deemed reasonable.   
 
 ▪  Use of surface water:   
 
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 (1966) – Lessee was 
not entitled to use water from private pond or tank of lessor under “free water” lease 
clause; lessee liable for damages caused by unreasonable surface use. 
  
 ▪  Drilling on planned homesite: 
 
Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974) – Lessor 
was awarded actual damages where lessee drilled well on proposed homesite, thereby 
unreasonably interfering with the known planned use of the surface by lessor, since 
alternative drilling site was available.  Because the damage to the homesite was 
considered “permanent” by the Court, diminution in value was the proper measure of 
damages. 
 
 B.  The Arkansas Rule – Corollary Rights and Restrictions
 
 Unfortunately, the Arkansas courts have not yet outlined an exhaustive set of 
rules to be applied generally in adjudicating the correlative rights of mineral owners / 
lessees and surface owners / lessors.  The cases on this subject contain a smorgasbord of 
quotes and snippets from various oil and gas treatises and cases from other states.   One 
of the most succinct summaries of a general rule applicable to lessees is found in 
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Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 (1966), where the 
Court stated: 
 
It is true that an oil and gas lease gives with it the right to possession of the 
surface to the extent reasonably necessary to enable a lessee to perform the 
obligations imposed upon him by the lease.  This includes the right to enter 
upon the premises and use so much of it, and in such manner, as may be 
reasonably necessary to carry out the terms of the lease and effectuate its 
purpose. 
 
Id. at 950, 403 S.W.2d at 55.  In a more recent case, Justice Hannah5 stated, in a 
concurring opinion, what he referred to as the “well settled” rule with regard to the rights 
of mineral owners and surface owners as follows: 
 
The respective rights of mineral and surface owners are well settled.   The 
owner of the minerals has an implied right to go upon the surface to drill 
wells to his underlying estate, and to occupy so much of the surface beyond 
the limits of his well as may be necessary to operate his estate and to remove 
its products.  Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 
S.W.2d 160 (1974).   His use of the surface, however, must be reasonable.  
Id.  The rights implied in favor of the mineral estate are to be exercised with 
due regard for the rights of the surface owner.   See id. (citing Getty Oil Co. v. 
Jones, 470  S.W.2d 618 (Tex.1971)). 
 
Bonds v. Carter, 348 Ark. 591, 601-02, 75 S.W.3d 192, 199 (2002) (Hannah, J., 
concurring).  While these two formulations are similar, a consistent rule, or set of rules, 
consistently applied would be helpful to guide mineral owners, surface owners, and 
lessees in assessing their rights and responsibilities.   
 
 Based on a combination of the Arkansas decisions, the correlative rights of 
mineral owners / lessees and surface owners / lessors with regard to surface use can be 
expressed as corollary rules of rights and limitations: 
 
Rights of Surface Use 
 
I.  The mineral owner or his lessee has an implied right to occupy and use so much of 
the surface as is reasonably necessary to remove and produce the minerals.  Bonds v. 
Carter, 348 Ark. 591, 601, 75 S.W.3d 192 (2002) (Hannah, J., concurring); Diamond 
Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); Arkansas Louisiana 
Gas Co. v. Wood, 240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 (1966); Wood v. Hay, 206 Ark. 892, 175 
S.W.2d 189 (1943); Martin v. Dale, 180 Ark. 321, 21 S.W.2d 428 (1929). 
 
II.  The mineral owner or his lessee, absent a contractual agreement otherwise, is not 
liable to the surface owner for surface damages unless the mineral owner / lessee  is 
negligent or has exceeded the reasonably necessary use of the surface.  Diamond 
                                                 
5 The Honorable Jim Hannah is now Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court. 
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Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 891, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974) (“It is a well-
settled principle that injury necessarily inflicted in the exercise of a lawful right does not 
create a liability.  The injury must be a direct result of the commission of a wrong.”); 
Koury v. Morgan, 172 Ark. 405, 288 S.W. 929, 931 (1926); LeCroy v. Barney, 12 F.2d 
363 (8th Cir. 1926) (Applying Arkansas law, no damages allowed for necessary 
activities). 
 
Restrictions on Rights of Surface Use 
 
III.  The mineral owner’s or lessee’s use of the surface must be reasonable (or 
“reasonably necessary”).  E.g., Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 
S.W.2d 160 (1974); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 
(1966). 
 
IV.  The mineral owner’s or lessee’s use of the surface must be non-negligent.  
Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 891, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); Koury 
v. Morgan, 172 Ark. 405, 288 S.W. 929, 931 (1926). 
 
V.  The mineral owner’s or lessee’s use of the surface must be exercised with due 
regard for the rights and uses of the surface owner.  Bonds v. Carter, 348 Ark. 591, 
601, 75 S.W.3d 192 (2002) (Hannah, J., concurring) (“The rights implied in favor of the 
mineral estate are to be exercised with due regard for the rights of the surface owner.”) 
citing Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470  S.W.2d 618 (Tex.1971); McFarland v. Taylor, 76 Ark. 
App. 343, 346-47, 65 S.W.3d 468 (2002); See Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 
Ark. 886, 891, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); Martin v. Dale, 180 Ark. 321, 21 S.W.2d 428 
(1929) (Lessee had duty to operate “in the manner least injurious” to the surface owner.). 
 
VI.  In the exceptional case where the mineral owner’s or lessee’s use of the surface 
completely destroys other surface uses, he may be liable to the surface owner even if 
the destructive use is reasonably necessary.  Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 
181, 313 S.W.2d 839 (1958) (Severed mineral estate owner had right to conduct open pit 
mining for manganese and could not be enjoined.  But because open pit mining resulted 
in complete destruction of the surface estate, leaving “the surface owner with nothing but 
a ‘hole in the ground’ for his agricultural pursuits,” the surface owner was entitled to 
damages for complete destruction of the surface.) 
 
C.  The Accommodation Doctrine and Reasonable Alternatives
 
 The so-called “Accommodation Doctrine” was articulated by the Texas Supreme 
Court in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470  S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex.1971).  See also 4 W. L. 
SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 652 (Supp. 2003).  In general, the doctrine is a more 
elaborate statement of the rule above that the mineral owner/lessee must operate with 
“due regard” for the rights and uses of the surface owner.  The Getty Oil decision has 
been cited several times by Arkansas appellate courts in describing the mineral owner’s 
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restriction to reasonable use of the surface,6 although the decisions have stopped short of 
referring directly to the “Accommodation Doctrine.”  Generally, the Doctrine can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
[W]here a severed mineral interest owner or lessee asserts a right to surface 
uses that will substantially impair existing uses of the surface owner, the 
mineral owner or lessee must accommodate the existing surface uses if 
reasonable alternatives are available. 
 
SUMMERS OIL & GAS, supra, at 1.   
  
 The controversy in Getty Oil arose when an oil company installed a beam pump 
that interfered with a farmer’s (Jones) center-pivot irrigation system.  The beam pump 
was too high to permit the self-propelled irrigation system from traveling in its circular 
pattern to irrigate Jones’ field.  Jones asked the oil company to either use a shorter beam 
pump or place the pump in a pit to accommodate his irrigation system.  The oil company 
refused, arguing that the pump was reasonably necessary for production of oil and gas.  
The Texas trial court agreed with Getty that its surface use was reasonable, but the court 
of civil appeals reversed.  The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of civil appeals 
and introduced the Accommodation Doctrine, stating: 
 
[W]here there is an existing use by the surface owner which would otherwise 
be precluded or impaired, and where under the established practices in the 
industry there are alternatives available to the lessee whereby the minerals 
can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require the 
adoption of an alternative by the lessee.7
*  *  * 
Getty's use of an alternative method of producing its wells would serve the 
public policy of developing our mineral resources while, at the same time, 
permitting the utilization of the surface for productive agricultural uses.  
Under such circumstances the right of the surface owner to an 
accommodation between the two estates may be shown, dependent, of course, 
upon the state of the evidence and the findings of the trier of the facts. 
 
Getty Oil Co., 470  S.W.2d at 622-23. 
 
 Many of the principles used in constructing the Accommodation Doctrine in Getty 
have been applied in Arkansas cases noted above.  The Arkansas appellate courts have 
repeatedly cited Getty in support of “reasonable use” decisions, and the Supreme Court 
referred to the opinion as “very persuasive.”8  It stands to reason that the underlying 
                                                 
6 Bonds v. Carter, 348 Ark. 591, 601, 75 S.W.3d 192 (2002) (Hannah, J., concurring); Diamond Shamrock 
Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 891, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974); McFarland v. Taylor, 76 Ark. App. 343, 346-
47, 65 S.W.3d 468 (2002). 
7 Quoted in Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 891, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974). 
8 Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 891, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974). 
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public policy statement and later applications of the Getty decision in Texas may supply 
persuasive arguments in future Arkansas decisions.   
 
 
 
D.  Lessee’s Implied Duty to Restore the Surface
 
 Although a mineral owner or lessee has the implied right to use (and cause 
damage to) the surface as reasonably necessary to produce oil and gas, when production 
ceases, that use and its attendant surface damage are no longer reasonable.  In 1986, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court held that “the duty to restore the surface, as nearly as 
practicable, to the same condition as it was before drilling is implied in the lease 
agreement.”  Bonds v. Sanchez-O’Brien Oil and Gas Co., 289 Ark. 582, 585, 715 S.W.2d 
444, 446 (1986).  The Court explained that: “To hold otherwise would allow the lessee to 
continue to occupy the surface, without change, after the lease has ended.  This would 
constitute an unreasonable use, and no rule is more firmly established in oil and gas law 
than the rule that the lessee is limited to a use of the surface which is reasonable.”  Id.  
Furthermore, lessee’s implied duty of surface restoration “runs with the lease.”  Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co., 356 Ark. 324, 151 S.W.3d 306 
(2004).  In Chevron, the Court noted that an assignee of an oil and gas lease “should be 
held to have known that it was taking on the duty to restore any existing surface damage” 
on the assigned leasehold.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION
 
 Many of the conflicts arising between lessees and surface owners can be avoided 
by using oil and gas leases which clearly identify the scope of surface use rights and 
provide for appropriate damage payments to the lessor.  Of course, if the mineral estate is 
severed, the surface owner has no say in the lease terms.  It is likely that the Arkansas 
courts will be sympathetic to surface owners burdened with leases to which they are not a 
party and from which they will reap no economic benefit.  Many prudent operators 
provide damage payments to surface owners, even where the damage is reasonably 
necessary and the lessee has no legal liability for such payments.   
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